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Abstract
This paper constructs a simple model to identify a benchmark of the food
stamp subsidy scheme – households’ food expenditure no less than the Thrifty
Food Plan (TFP) amount with the minimum amount of food stamp. More
specifically, if the household income is sufficiently low, only the corner solution
exists and full subsidy is needed. Due to this crowding-out effect, the current
linearly regressive food stamp subsidy scheme fails to achieve its stated aim.
JEL classification: D11, H23, I38
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1 Introduction
The current literature focuses on the issue why governments choose to redistribute
in-kind rather than in cash (Currie and Gahvari 2008) and on empirical studies of
the marginal propensity to consume food out of food stamp income and cash in-
come (Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2009). The details of how in-kind transfers, more
specifically the subsidy scheme, are provided are rarely studied.
The subsidy scheme of the current food stamp program, which is called Supple-
mental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), is linearly regressive as follows.1
The amount of SNAP benefits you get is the TFP amount for your house-
hold minus 30% of your net income, where the Thrifty Food Plan
(TFP) is a model for how much money a household should spend on
food. So if you spend 30% of your net income on food, but you still can’t
spend as much as the TFP says you should, SNAP give you the rest.
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The main question of inquiry is: what would be the minimum amount of food
stamp that families with different income levels should receive to ensure that the gov-
ernment’s objective is satisfied? A simple model is constructed to identify a bench-
mark of the food stamp subsidy scheme – households’ food expenditure no less than
the Thrifty Food Plan (TFP) amount with the minimum amount of food stamp. In-
tuitively, if the household income is sufficiently low, only the corner solution exists,
in which the household only spends the amount of food stamp subsidy, while all its
own food expenditure in the absence of subsidy would be crowded out. Due to this
crowding-out effect, to have the food expenditure no less than the TFP amount,
full subsidy is needed and thus the current linearly regressive food stamp subsidy
scheme fails to achieve its stated aim.
2 The Model
Suppose households have a common utility function: U(X, Y ) = X
3
10Y
7
10 , where X
is the food consumption and Y the composite good.2 Each household solves the
following problem.
max
X,Y
U(X,Y ) = X
3
10Y
7
10
s.t. PXX + Y =M + S if PXX > S
Y =M if PXX ≤ S
where M is the household income, S the amount of subsidy, PX the food price, and
PXX the food expenditure. The following proposition identifies a benchmark of the
food stamp subsidy scheme – households’ food expenditure no less than the TFP
amount with the minimum amount of food stamp.
Proposition 1 The following subsidy scheme achieves the government’s aim – house-
holds’ food expenditure no less than the TFP amount – with the minimum amount of
food stamp.  S = TFP if M <
7
3
TFP
S = 10
3
(TFP − 3
10
M) if 7
3
TFP ≤M < 10
3
TFP
S = 0 if M ≥ 10
3
TFP
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, if the income of the household is below some threshold, only the corner
solution exists, in which the household only spends the amount of food stamp subsidy,
while all its own food expenditure in the absence of subsidy would be crowded out.
To have PXX ≥ TFP , full subsidy is needed: S = TFP . Further, if the income
2Based on the current linearly regressive subsidy scheme, we assume the Cobb-Douglas utility
function U(X,Y ) = XαY 1−α and set α = 310 . In reality, spending on food accounts for a larger
share of total spending at very low levels of income. Therefore, α may increase as M decreases.
2
of the household is high, we have the interior solution. Only partial of its own food
expenditure in the absence of subsidy would be crowded out. To have PXX ≥ TFP ,
only partial subsidy is needed to the extent that the income of the household is so
high that its own food expenditure would be greater than the TFP amount in the
absence of subsidy.
In contrast, the current linearly regressive subsidy scheme is:{
S = TFP − 3
10
M if M < 10
3
TFP
S = 0 if M ≥ 10
3
TFP
Similar to the proof of proposition 1, for households with income M < 10
3
TFP ,
PXX < TFP .
3 That is, the current linearly regressive subsidy scheme fails to achieve
its stated aim.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 The government solves the following problem, subject to the
household’s problem.
min
S
S
s.t. PXX ≥ TFP ≥ S maxX,Y U(X,Y ) = X
3
10Y
7
10
s.t. PXX + Y =M + S if PXX > S
Y =M if PXX ≤ S

Suppose the household has the interior solution: PXX = 310(M + S). To minimize S, the
constraint PXX ≥ TFP ≥ S requires PXX = 310(M + S) = TFP ≥ S, which implies
S = 103 (TFP − 310M) and 73TFP ≤ M < 103 TFP . Similarly, suppose the household has
the corner solution: PXX = S. To minimize S, the constraint PXX ≥ TFP ≥ S requires
PXX = S = TFP . In this case, the possible interior solution is out of the budget set. That
is, 310(M + S) =
3
10(M + TFP ) < S = TFP , which implies M <
7
3TFP .
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